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I.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (INVESTIGATION
COORDINATOR ALEX WHITING AND DEFENSE COUNSEL RODNEY DIXON)
General

During 2010, criticism continued that only Africans have
been indicted by the ICC so far. Double standards and a new form of
Western law-driven colonialism of African nations were among the
complaints.
How did the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the
judges counter this criticism? What non-African situations are
being actively reviewed by the OTP and what progress was made
during 2010 in those particular reviews? (e.g., Colombia,
Georgia, Palestine, Afghanistan, Honduras, Korea). Does the
OTP’s review of the massacre in Guinea and violence in Cote
D’Ivoire and Nigeria reveal an inescapable reality of having to
keep the focus on Africa?
One of the greatest challenges facing the ICC in 2010 was the
continuing need to apprehend indicted fugitives. For example,
indicted Sudan President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Ahmad
Harun, Ali Kushayb, Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) co-indictees, and Bosco Ntaganda remained at large. Some
enjoy the protection of their own government while others enjoy
virtual sanctuaries on foreign territory.
What tools has the OTP employed to seek arrest of these
indictees? Is there any reason to be optimistic for 2011?
The OTP issued a draft paper on the preliminary
examinations a few months ago and has been eliciting comments.
The paper is interesting on many levels, particularly with its
attention to admissibility issues, including gravity requirements.
What can you tell us about the content of the paper; how
is it intended to guide the work of the OTP in examining
situations and arriving at decisions on whether to seek
investigative authority from the Pre-Trial Chamber, and what
experts have been writing in about it?
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s nine year term in office
will expire this year.
Understanding that you are part of the OTP and thus
suitably reserved on such matters, can you still describe to us
what is transpiring in terms of selecting his successor? Are there
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any openly-declared candidates? How might his legacy best be
described?
Democratic Republic of the Congo

1. In the Katanga/Ngudjolo case, 2010 saw a wide range of
decisions by the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber decisions on
victim participation. The Appeals Chamber, on May 24, 2010,
found that for victims’ participation in appeals brought under Article
82(1)(d) of the Rome Statute, four cumulative criteria must be met;
they also found that such criteria were in fact met. The fourth
criterion was that the manner of participation should neither cause
prejudice to nor be inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a
fair and impartial trial.
How does the OTP view such rulings that embrace a
vigorous victim participation in the case?
2. In the Lubanga case, 2010 was nearly as turbulent as 2008
when the issue of potentially exculpatory evidence almost dismissed
the case. On July 8, 2010, Trial Chamber I ordered a stay in the
proceedings on grounds that the fair trial of the accused is no longer
possible due to non-implementation of the Chambers orders by the
Prosecution to confidentially disclose to the Defense the names and
other necessary identifying information of a particular witness. On
July 15, 2010, the Trial Chamber ordered the release of Lubanga.
On October 8, 2010, the Appeals Chamber reversed Trial Chamber
I’s stay; the Trial Chamber had erred by resorting immediately to a
stay of proceedings without first imposing sanctions under Article 71
to bring about the Prosecutor’s compliance with its orders. The stay
of proceedings was the key element underpinning the decision to
release Lubanga, so reversing it vitiates the release order. There was
no finding that Lubanga was detained for an unreasonable period due
to the inexcusable delay of the Prosecutor, and it was considered
inappropriate for the Appeals Chamber to enter findings for the Trial
Chamber on these points.
Which priority should prevail—the protection of
witnesses or expediting the trial proceedings? How did the
Lubanga case almost appear to collapse with the ordered release
of Lubanga, and why was the OTP, to the extreme displeasure of
the Trial Chamber, so rigid in its protection of a key witness’s
identity? Could this crisis in the case have been averted or
handled differently?
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Darfur, Sudan

1. Regarding the indicted fugitives Ahmad Harun & Ali
Kushayb, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo issued a press release on
November 6, 2010, highlighting the ICC Judges’ decision of May
25, 2010, which informed the U.N. Security Council that Sudan was
not respecting UNSC Resolution 1593, as it had refused to arrest
Harun and Kushayb. Moreno-Ocampo described in particular
Harun’s many activities in Darfur through the years and to the
present time, including attacks on civilians and managing the crime
of extermination in the camps for displaced persons, the same people
whose displacement he had orchestrated. “He should be arrested
before he commits new crimes in his new position,” MorenoOcampo said. As recently as January 13, 2011, Harun visited Abyei,
apparently with the assistance of the U.N. mission in Sudan, which
attracted strong criticism from Amnesty International.
How is the OTP continuing its investigation of both
Harun and Kushayb while they remain at large? Are Harun’s
activities highly incriminating such that they might lead to an
amended indictment in the future? What is the strategy, if any,
of the Security Council to secure their surrender to the ICC?
2. In the case of indicted fugitive President Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, 2010 proved to be an eventful year on many
fronts. First, on January 28, 2010, the Appeals Chamber found that
eight victims fulfilled the criteria for participation in an appeal,
which is abnormal, but the Appeals Chamber concluded that “in light
of the extraordinary circumstances of the present case, which
impeded the Victims from approaching the Chamber earlier,” their
was participation appropriate; the Appeals Chamber allowed them to
make substantive submissions to the case. Judge Sang-Hyun Song
dissented, stating, “Victims who did not participate in the underlying
proceedings have no right to participate in the ensuing appeal.”
How do you assess the Appeals Chamber’s decision to
permit the eight victims to participate in the appeals proceeding?
Is that a role for victims that OTP embraces?
Second, on February 3, 2010, the Appeals Chamber reversed
the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 2009 decision on the scope of the
indictment against Al Bashir. The Appeals Chamber found that to
require that the existence of genocidal intent be the only reasonable
conclusion in order to meet the standard of “reasonable grounds to
believe” for issuance of an arrest warrant would amount to requiring
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the Prosecutor to disprove any other reasonable conclusions and to
eliminate any reasonable doubt. Such a standard of proof is too
demanding at the arrest warrant stage, essentially when requiring the
Prosecutor to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt before trial.
Instead, the “reasonable grounds” standard at the warrant stage must
be distinguished from the “substantial grounds to believe” standard
at the confirmation stage and the “beyond reasonable doubt”
standard at trial.
Why did it take so long for the Appeals Chamber to
render a relatively simple reversal of the Pre-Trial Chamber on
the scope of the indictment and the standard of reasonable
grounds to believe?
Third, on July 12, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I delivered its
new decision, issuing charges of genocide for the first time in the
ICC’s history. The Chamber agreed that its prior ruling implied that
there were indeed reasonable grounds to suspect specific genocidal
intent, and that this was sufficient under the correct standard of proof
for an arrest warrant. There were reasonable grounds to believe that
the attacks on victims of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups were
made based on the ethnic composition of the villages. There also
were reasonable grounds to believe that the attacks took place “in the
context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against the
target group or must have had such a nature so as to itself effect, the
total or partial destruction of the targeted group.”
The Prosecutor invoked Articles 6(a), 6(b), and 6(c) of the
Rome Statute. The Chamber agreed with the Article 6(a) (killing)
and 6(b) (seriously bodily or mental harm) prongs of genocide. As
for 6(c) (deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of
life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction), the
Prosecution argued that the methods of destruction used by Al
Bashir included the: i) destruction of the group’s means of survival
in its homeland; ii) systematic displacement from their homes into
inhospitable terrain where some died as a result of thirst, starvation,
and disease; iii) usurpation of the land; and iv) denial and hindrance
of medical and other humanitarian assistance needed to sustain life
in internally displaced person (IDP) camps. The Chamber also noted
the fostering of insecurity among the displaced, the occasional
contamination of the wells in the attacked towns, and the
encouragement of other tribes to resettle in the lands previously
inhabited by the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups. The Chamber
found there were reasonable grounds to believe that the subjective
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elements of genocide (deliberately inflicting on the target group
conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical
destruction) were fulfilled. The Chamber further decided that there
were reasonable grounds to believe that rape was committed within
Count 2, namely the Article 6(b) category of serious bodily or
mental harm. But there is no mention of rape in the Chamber’s
decision regarding Count 3, namely the Article 6(c) category of
deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about
physical destruction.
How important was the Pre-Trial Chamber I’s July 12th
decision, which expanded the indictment against Al Bashir to
include genocide?
Was this a “game changer” for the
Prosecution’s case against Al Bashir and did it lead to significant
aftershocks in the region and in Al Bashir’s conduct (for better
or worse)? Did it open up new avenues of investigation for the
OTP against Al Bashir? The PTC’s approval of 6(a), 6(b), and
6(c) categories of genocide for the indictment must have
encouraged the Prosecutor. However, was he disappointed that
the charge of rape as genocide was seemingly not adopted by the
PTC for an Article 6(c) charge? Is there an opening for rape as
genocide under “torture” regarding Count 3 (Art. 6(c)) as
discussed in paragraph 37 of the Second Decision? Has the
PTC’s second request for cooperation in making the arrest and
surrender of Al Bashir for both the first and second warrants—a
request submitted to Sudan, all States Parties of the Rome
Statute, and all of the U.N. Security Council members—been at
all useful to date in at least galvanizing interest in achieving that
key objective?
Fourth, the PTC issued four decisions seeking to enforce the
arrest warrants against Al Bashir. These pertained to Al Bashir’s
visits to Kenya, Chad, and the Central African Republic in the latter
half of 2010. None of these countries arrested Al Bashir during his
visits and none of the countries submitted requested reports to the
ICC.
What explains the total lack of cooperation by
neighboring African states—all States Parties to the ICC—in the
arrest of Al Bashir during his many travels in 2010? In its
report to the Security Council, the ICC stated, “[M]any
challenges remain, but none is more pressing than the execution
of the nine outstanding warrants of arrest.” Is the ICC facing a
crisis of legitimacy, particularly among its own States Parties?
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3. In the case of Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, charged with three
war crimes pertaining to the September 29, 2007, attack against the
African Union Mission in Sudan—the peacekeeping mission
stationed at the Haskanita Military Group Site in Umm Kadada,
Darfur—the Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously declined to confirm
the charges on February 8, 2010. The PTC was not satisfied that
there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to
believe Abu Garda could be held criminally responsible either as a
direct or indirect co-perpetrator for the commission of the crimes
charged by the Prosecutor.
How did Abu Garda escape prosecution? Did what the
PTC determined meet the Rome Statute’s requirement that
there be “sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds” to
believe that the crimes occurred and that the person charged
committed those crimes? Why, on April 23, 2010, did the PTC
reject the Prosecutor’s application to appeal? Is the Prosecutor
intending to further investigate Abu Garda?
Central African Republic

The trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo commenced on
November 22, 2010. Bemba was the President and Commander-inChief of the Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC). An armed
conflict took place in the CAR from October 26, 2002, to March 15,
2003, during which part of the national armed forces of Ange-Felix
Patasse, the then President of the CAR, allied with combatants of the
MLC, led by Bemba, were confronted by a rebel movement led by
Francois Bozize, the former Chief-of-Staff of the Central African
armed forces. Bemba is charged with knowing that MLC troops
were committing crimes and did not take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his power to prevent or repress their
commission. There are 759 victims authorized to participate in the
proceedings.
Why is the Bemba trial so important for the Prosecutor?
Was it primarily the rape charges that elevated the importance
of this case? Are there ongoing investigations relating to other
possible suspects?
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Uganda

In light of the failure to arrest any of the indicted
fugitives of the three surviving Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
leaders, including Joseph Kony, how would you describe the
status of the Uganda cases and any ongoing investigations?
What occurred in the Ugandan Government in 2010 either to
strengthen or weaken complementarity practice in that country?
How have the indictments affected the behavior and conduct of
the LRA and its leaders? Is there any particular arrest strategy
that the OTP favors, namely, large-scale military operations
(akin to what happened one year ago cross-border with the
DRC) or “undercover” efforts?
Kenya

A disputed election and subsequent political/ethnic violence
in 2007 left more than 1,100 dead, 3,500 injured, and up to 600,000
people forcibly displaced. During 60 days of violence, there were
hundreds of rapes, if not more, and over 100,000 properties were
destroyed in six of Kenya’s eight provinces. The clashes erupted
along tribal lines following an announcement that Mwai Kibaki—a
Kikuyu—had won a vote that opponents said was rigged. The
bloodbath ended when President Kibaki and his rival, Raila Odinga,
agreed to share power, with Mr. Odinga becoming prime minister.
The situation in Kenya was brought before the ICC when the
OTP received information about crimes committed in Kenya in
relation to the post-election violence of 2007-2008. Following an
analysis, the Prosecutor took the view that there is a reasonable basis
to proceed with an investigation.
On March 31, 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber granted the
Prosecutor’s request to commence an investigation on crimes against
humanity allegedly committed in Kenya. The majority found that
the information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that
crimes against humanity have been committed on Kenyan territory.
The majority found that all criteria for the exercise of the Court’s
jurisdiction were satisfied to the requisite standard of proof.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul held that
the crimes committed in Kenya do not qualify as crimes against
humanity under the jurisdictional ambit of the Statute. In particular,
Judge Kaul disagreed with the majority on the requirements of a
“State or organizational policy” as set out in Article 7(2)(a) of the
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Statute. Given the fact that the fundamental rationale of crimes
against humanity as codified in Article 7 of the Statute was to protect
the international community against the extremely grave threat
emanating from such policies, Judge Kaul concluded that it had to be
adopted either by a State or at the policy-making level of a State-like
organization. Upon analysis of the supporting material, Judge Kaul
concluded that there was no reasonable basis to believe that the
crimes committed on the territory of the Republic of Kenya in
relation to the post-election violence of 2007-2008 were committed
in an attack against a civilian population pursuant to or in
furtherance of a policy stemming from a State or an organization.
Describe how the majority and Judge Hans-Peter Kaul
disagreed about a critical definitional factor in determining
whether crimes against humanity had occurred in Kenya,
regarding their respective opinions in the Pre-Trial Chamber on
March 31, 2010. The OTP clearly disagrees with Judge Kaul,
but what should we conclude about his reading of the available
evidence? Isn’t it particularly hard, as an investigator, to satisfy
the “State or organizational policy” requirement of crimes
against humanity?
On December 15, 2010, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo
requested that the ICC issue summonses to appear against six
Kenyan citizens to face justice for massive crimes committed during
the post-election violence in Kenya. The OTP brought two cases,
three defendants each, and requested summons to appear for each.
The Prosecutor concluded that there are reasonable grounds
to believe crimes against humanity were committed in two cases.
The first case names the following Odinga allies: Henry Kosgey,
Minister for Industrialization; William Ruto, suspended Education
Minister; and Joshua Arap Sang, radio executive. Moreno-Ocampo
alleged that Ruto began plotting attacks on supporters of President
Mwai Kibaki a year before the election and worked together with
Minister for Industrialization Henry Kosgey and radio broadcaster
Joshua Sang to coordinate a campaign of killing and forced
deportations in the Rift Valley.
In the second case, the Prosecution names the following
Kibaki allies: Uhuru Kenyatta, deputy Prime Minister and Finance
Minister; Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Secretary to the Cabinet; and
Mohammed Hussein Ali, former Police Chief. Moreno-Ocampo
charged Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta—son of Kenyan
independence hero and founding president Jomo Kenyatta—
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alongside Cabinet Secretary Francis Muthaura and former Police
Commissioner Major General Mohammed Hussein Ali with murder,
deportation, persecution, rape, and inhumane acts allegedly
committed in retaliation against supporters of Prime Minister Raila
Odinga.
The accused all proclaimed their innocence.
In December 2010, Kenyan MPs voted overwhelmingly for
the country to pull out of the Rome Statute. According to the BBC, if
the government backs the MPs it would take at least a year for
Kenya to formally withdraw from the ICC, but active cases would
not be halted. In January 2011, a special division of the Kenyan
High Court emerged as the local option to try the “Ocampo Six,” the
six persons named in the submissions by the ICC OTP to the PreTrial Chamber requesting indictments. Both sides of the Coalition
Government agreed to create a local alternative to the ICC. The
government recalled Parliament for a vote overhauling the Judiciary
and Kenya Police Service. The agreement includes expediting the
appointments with the intention of expediting the appointment of a
new Chief Justice, Attorney General, Director of Public
Prosecutions, and Inspector General of Police; moving quickly to
recruit new office holders, including both high court and appellate
judges; and establishing the Supreme Court to give the judiciary a
new face and the capacity to handle the post-election chaos cases.
The hope is that with new faces at the Judiciary and Police force, the
U.N. Security Council would ask the ICC to defer the case against
the Kenyans. Kenyan officials are lobbying other African leaders for
support.
The only constitutional way to try the Ocampo Six is to
create a special division of the High Court, as the new Constitution
prohibits creation of a local tribunal that works outside the
jurisdiction of the Kenya criminal system. In Article 162(1), the
Constitution states: "The superior courts are the Supreme Court, the
High Court and the courts referred to in clause 2 (which are to be
established by Parliament)." This means that a special division of
the High Court, as provided for in the International Crimes Act,
which defines the crimes against humanity, genocide and war
crimes, is the only option. Section 8(2) of the International Crimes
Act, states: “A trial authorised by this section to be conducted in
Kenya shall be conducted in the High Court.”
There now is a serious complementarity challenge afoot
in Kenya. What is the OTP’s response to that challenge and
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what strategy might we see unfold in the weeks ahead? What
does this say about the conduct of a State Party during various
stages of an investigative and indictment procedure? Kenya
appears to have worked its way through this process a bit
chaotically and, not surprisingly, with politics as a dominant
feature. Might this experience speak to a new start for
cooperation agreements where State Parties agree, in advance, to
follow established procedures under complementarity and
ultimately ICC jurisdictional action so as to avoid the likes of
Kenya’s belated January initiative?
II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA (SENIOR PROSECUTING TRIAL ATTORNEY TOM HANNIS
AND DEFENSE COUNSEL RODNEY DIXON)
Vujadin Popoviü et al. (Srebrenica)

The Trial Chamber rendered its judgment on June 10, 2010.
All seven Bosnian Serb defendants were found guilty and sentenced
to imprisonment ranging from five years to life imprisonment. The
Trial Chamber found that there was a joint criminal enterprise (JCE)
to murder and a JCE to forcibly remove civilians. It also found that
some members of the JCE to murder had genocidal intent and thus
genocide was committed at Srebrenica. Both JCEs also had the
requisite special intent for the crime of persecution. There was a
widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. This
attack commenced with the issuance of Directive 7 and had various
components, including the strangulation of the enclaves through the
restriction of humanitarian supplies, the gradual weakening and
disabling of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and
a planned military assault on the enclaves, and culminated in the
removal of thousands of people from Srebrenica and Zepa.
Applying the legal elements of the crimes charged in the indictment
to the proven facts, the Trial Chamber found that the following
crimes were committed by members of the Bosnian Serb forces in
various locations alleged in the indictment: genocide; conspiracy to
commit genocide; extermination as a crime against humanity;
murder, cruel and inhuman treatment, terrorizing civilians, and
forcible transfer, as acts of persecution and a crime against
humanity; and forcible transfer as an inhumane act and crime against
humanity. The Trial Chamber did not find that the crime of
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deportation had been proven. Individual criminal responsibility was
found against Popoviü, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir
Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero, and Vinko Pandurevic.
Remind us what the Prosecution emphasized during its
closing arguments in early September 2009 for the on-going
Srebrenica joint trial. Given the historical significance of the
Srebrenica genocide, how did prior judgments relating to
Srebrenica and the trials yet to proceed on Srebrenica (Karadžiü
and Mladiü) influence the Prosecution’s strategy? What were
the most significant moments in the trial, from the perspective of
the Prosecution? How did you argue the case against the
defendants on the issue of superior orders, which they must have
relied upon heavily for their defense? Why was this case against
three senior Bosnian Serb security officers for the genocide at
Srebrenica re-opened by the Prosecution after the Defense rested
its case on March 12, 2009? Did the four rebuttal witnesses
called by the Prosecution from late March to early May 2009
ultimately prove to be significant testimony?
Discuss the significance of this Srebrenica judgment, not
only for international criminal law but also for the survivors of
the genocide and for the legacy of the ICTY. Is this what it was
all about?
Has this judgment resonated throughout the
Balkans?
Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj (Kosovo)

On July 21, 2010, the Appeals Chamber ordered a partial retrial on certain acquittals of all three defendants based on the failure
of the Trial Chamber to grant the Prosecution an adequate extension
to acquire the testimony of two key witnesses. The majority stated
that the Trial Chamber “failed to appreciate the gravity of the threat
that witness intimidation posed to the trial’s integrity,” which
“undermined the fairness of the proceedings as guaranteed by the
Statute and Rules and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” The
Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber “seriously erred in
failing to take adequate measures to secure the testimony” of key
witnesses. While the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that decisions
regarding testimony of witnesses are within the Trial Chamber’s
discretion, because “serious witness intimidation…formed the
context of the trial,” the Trial Chamber’s “error undermined the
fairness of the proceedings as guaranteed by the Statute and Rules
and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” The Appeals Chamber also
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criticized the Trial Chamber for placing “undue emphasis” on the
Trial Chamber’s deadlines for presenting evidence, regardless of the
need to ensure the testimony of two key witnesses. This “misplaced
priority,” the Appeals Chamber continued, “demonstrates that the
Trial Chamber failed to appreciate the gravity of the threat that
witness intimidation posed to the trial’s integrity.”
Presiding Judge Robinson’s dissent stated in paragraph 32
that “[t]he Majority Opinion constitutes an overstepping by the
Appeals Chamber of its boundaries, and in doing so, confuses the
appellate with the trial function. This is a dangerous precedent,
which militates against the proper discharge by the Tribunal of its
mandate to try persons for serious breaches of international
humanitarian law.” His reasons: 1) The Trial Chamber was
sensitive to the importance of both witnesses’ testimony for the
Prosecution’s case and the general atmosphere of fear and
intimidation of witnesses by extending the case three times, and
remaining open to the possibility of granting a further extension
upon a showing by the Prosecution of a dramatic change in
circumstances. 2) The majority opinion amounts to “a substitution
of its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the Trial
Chamber, and that can only be done where a discernible error on the
part of the Trial Chamber can be demonstrated.” No error was
demonstrated. 3) By prioritizing the Prosecution’s right to present
its case through these witnesses over the right of the accused to an
expeditious trial, the majority “wrongly interpreted the relationship
between Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute, completely ignoring the
fact that the rights enumerated under Article 20 are to be applied
“with full respect for the rights of the accused” under Article 21(4).
Dixon: What is the Defense strategy for the partial retrial? What are we to understand about the alleged intimidation
of the two witnesses and their non-show in the first trial? How
do you, as Defense counsel, interpret due process standards in
light of the Appeals Chamber’s apparent attempt to enforce
them and achieve a fair trial? How do you square the right to an
expeditious trial with the complete presentation of evidence,
particularly incriminating evidence? How do you interpret
Judge Robinson’s dissent and are you arguing those points in the
partial re-trial? According to Robinson, did the Appeals
Chamber substitute its discretion for the Trial Chamber’s
without finding error first? How has the partial re-trial been
received in Kosovo? In Serbia?
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Hannis: Is this a clear cut victory for the Prosecution so
far? Were you hoping for a re-trial on additional issues? What
will the Trial Chamber undertake to secure the testimony of the
two witnesses?
Radovan Karadžiü

Following a Trial Chamber decision of November 5, 2009,
Karadžiü had to accept being joined by a counsel representing his
interests in the courtroom. That individual, Richard Harvey, was
appointed by the Registrar on November 19, 2009. The Chamber’s
decision found that Karadžiü had “substantially and persistently
obstructed the proper and expeditious conduct of his trial,” meeting
the test for appointment of counsel set out by the Appeals Chamber
in the Miloševiü case. The Chamber ordered the Registar to appoint
a counsel to prepare to represent the interests of Karadžiü at trial, and
ordered that the trial resume on March 1, 2010. However, the
Chamber further stated that Karadžiü would continue to represent
himself, including by dealing with day-to-day matters and by
preparing for trial, but that “should the accused continue to absent
himself from the resumed trial proceedings in March, or should he
engage in any other conduct that obstructs the proper and
expeditious conduct of the trial, he will forfeit his right to selfrepresentation, no longer be entitled to assistance from his assigned
Defense team, and the appointed counsel will take over as an
assigned counsel to represent him.” On March 1 and 2, 2010,
Karadžiü made his opening statement and the Prosecution started
presenting evidence on April 13, 2010. The trial continued through
2010.
How has Karadžiü’s self-representation (aided by
appointed counsel) worked out during 2010? How has the
Prosecution presented its case against him and what kind of
witnesses and incriminating documentation are being presented
by the Prosecution? Have there been any defense challenges for
exculpatory evidence? Has the Karadžiü trial been adequately
covered by the media, or has the trial gone subterranean? To
what extent is Mladiü’s absence in The Hague detrimental to the
prosecution of Karadžiü?
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Vojislav Šešelj

There were several rulings of interest in the Šešelj case. On
July 5, 2010, the Registry denied Šešelj’s request for the ICTY to
fund his trial because he had not provided the necessary
documentation. On October 29, however, the Trial Chamber ordered
the court to fund 50 percent of what would normally be given to an
indigent defendant. In November 2010, the Registry asked the
Appeals Chamber to quash the Trial Chamber’s decision about
funding, arguing that it had essentially usurped the Registry’s power.
Does the OTP have a dog in this fight? Why would the
Trial Chamber challenge the Registrar on this issue?
On February 2010, for the second time, Šešelj was charged
with contempt of court for disclosing information about 11 witnesses
in one of his books.
How has this charge of contempt of court progressed
through the year? How do you balance the right of an accused
to defend himself with the right of witnesses to their security and
privacy?
Prliü, Stojiü, Praljak, Petkoviü, ûoriü, and Pusiü (ethnic cleansing of
Muslims/non-Serbs)

On September 16, 2010, the Defense filed a motion seeking
the disqualification of Judge Prandler on grounds of bias. On
October 4, 2010, President Patrick Robinson denied the motion,
finding that the Defenses of Prliü and Praljak had failed to
substantiate any of their claims and therefore that it is not warranted
to appoint a panel to consider the motion. They had not established
any actual bias or the appearance of bias on the part of Judge
Prandler and had not rebutted the strong presumption of his
impartiality.
On December 15, 2010, the Trial Chamber ruled on Stojiü’s
November 30, 2010, Motion for Certification to Appeal the
Chamber’s denial on November 25, 2010, to reopen his case and
admit 66 documents requested by the Stojiü Defense in order to
refute evidence submitted by the Prosecution. The Chamber denied
the motion.
The Trial Chamber will hear the closing arguments for the
Prosecution on February 7, 2011, and for the Defense once the
Prosecutor has concluded. Final trial briefs were filed on January 4,
2011.
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How did the Prosecution present the evidence of ethnic
cleansing and align the defendants with the criminal acts
associated with ethnic cleansing? Is this a particularly strong
case on persecution (ethnic cleansing)?
Momþilo Perišiü (Sarajevo and Zagreb, assaults on civilians)

The Prosecution completed its presentation of evidence on
November 12, 2009, and the Defense began its case on February 22,
2010. One of the Defense’s major contentions is that the military
and political leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did
not influence the VRS or General Mladiü. On March 18, 2010,
Milenko Jevdjevic, commander of the signals battalion in the VRS
Drina Corps testified on Perišiü’s behalf. He asserted that after
Mladiü’s attack on Gorazde in April 1994, he received a message
from Perišiü in which Perišiü “kindly asked” Mladiü to “stop any
further actions of the VRS.”
On March 19, 2010, Perišiü filed a motion for a temporary
provisional release for the duration of the adjournment of the trial
from April 2, 2010, until the trial resumed on April 12, 2010. On
March 31, 2010, the Trial Chamber denied the Defense’s motion.
Although the Trial Chamber conceded that Perišiü did not pose a
potential danger or flight risk, it maintained that a temporary
provisional release is not appropriate in the absence of compelling
humanitarian reasons for granting it.
Were there any significant developments in the Perišiü
trial during 2010 and any testimony or evidence that proved
particularly revealing about the role of this key individual in the
leadership of the VJ? Why is Momþilo Perišiü’s case so
significant regarding how military forces lay siege to cities?
Šainoviü, Ojdaniü, Pavkoviü, Lazareviü, and Lukiü (Kosovo)

Following the February 26, 2009, Trial Chamber judgment,
which found Milan Milutinoviü not guilty, the other defendants
appealed and status conferences were held in May and September
2010. The next is scheduled for January 2011. The decisions
handed down in 2010 by the Appeals Chamber covered admission of
additional evidence by the Defense, motions for temporary release
on compassionate grounds, and Defense motions for extension of
time. On September 7, 2010, the Appeals Chamber approved the
filing of David Scheffer’s amicus curiae brief pertaining to the
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proper standard for aiding and abetting liability in the case
concerning Ojdaniü. A reply brief by counsel to Ojdaniü was filed.
What is the OTP’s view of the appeals in this case and
what can we expect to see unfold in 2011? I question the time
lapse between the filing of the appeals briefs and the action of
the Appeals Chamber. The briefs were filed in 2009 and the next
action is a status conference in January 2011. Perhaps this is a
good moment to ask everyone on the panel how to manage the
sheer size of the cases before the tribunals in ways that make
things more efficient.
How do the OTP and Mr. Dixon view the
intent/knowledge standard for aiding and abetting liability,
which is central to the Ojdaniü case?
Vlastimir Dordeviü (Kosovo)

The Prosecution originally closed its case on October 29,
2009, but reopened it to examine one more witness on May 17, 2010.
On May 20, 2010, the Defense rested its case. Closing arguments
were heard on July 13 and 14, 2010. Judgment is pending.
What is the back story about the new witness presented
by the Prosecution, and do you consider his/her testimony as
proving significant to the forthcoming judgment? How did the
Prosecution consider the overall trial record of the Dordeviü
case?
Ratko Mladiü and Goran Hadžiü (at large)

What was accomplished during 2010 to bring the
Prosecution closer to the apprehension of Mladiü and Hadžiü?
Why have their apprehensions proven so difficult? How did
Serbia’s efforts to seek admission to the European Union
progress despite the fact that Mladiü remains at large? Does the
Prosecutor have a position on Serbia’s application to the E.U.
and any conditionality related to Mladiü in particular that
should be associated with it?
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III. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
(REGISTRAR ADAMA DIENG AND DEFENSE COUNSEL RODNEY DIXON)
A. General

Mr. Registrar: You are completing your tenth year as
Registrar of the ICTR. Share with us some reflections about
that decade of service.
—How has the ICTR evolved during the last decade?
What is the most significant difference today in its operations
from the day you began serving as Registrar in January 2011?
—During the mid-1990s, the ICTR had great difficulties
with charges of inefficiency and even corruption. That tarnished
the international reputation of the ICTR at the time. Yet the
operation and work product of the ICTR since the late 1990s
and through the last decade has been impressive. Explain how
that came about and how you cast off the demons of that early
period.
—How do you assess the Security Council’s recent
approval of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals? Explain how this will enable the ICTR to achieve its
completion strategy and wrap up its docket of cases, at least to
some reasonable extent, and then transition to the Residual
Mechanism. Do you foresee any particular difficulties in that
process over the coming years?
—You worked with two different prosecutors, Carla del
Ponte and Hassan Jallow. I don’t expect you to speak “out of
school” here, but compare them a bit for us.
—How has your relationship with the Government of
Rwanda fared during these years? I know Mr. Dixon is on stage
with you here and should address this question too. But it is
important to understand what the concerns and mandates of the
ICTR have been that have clashed with those of the Rwandan
government. This was a mighty problem in the 1990s and it
continued through the last decade, particularly on the issues of
arrests and delegation of cases to Rwandan courts.
—How difficult has the financial situation for the ICTR
been during the last decade? How do you explain to government
officials and the public that the costs of the ICTR relative to
other national courts and how their budgets are allocated are
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comparatively reasonable, if not a bargain given the dimensions
of the crimes committed in Rwanda?
—You were instrumental in the creation of the African
Court on Human and People’s Rights. Are you confident that
regional court can begin to pick up where the ICTR leaves off in
its final years of operation? Can the African Court begin to
address atrocity crimes and if so, how might it do so in the
coming years?
During 2010, the Tribunal rendered five trial and two appeals
judgments, leaving ten pending judgments at the trial level.
According to the Completion Strategy Report released on December
6, 2010, the Tribunal’s President, Judge Byron, stated that the
Tribunal expects “four trials with respect to 15 accused in the first
half of 2011, and the remaining six judgments with respect to seven
accused before the end of 2011.” To accomplish this, the Tribunal
has requested authorization for three judges’ terms to be extended.
President Byron projected that the Tribunal expects to
complete the evidentiary stage in the first quarter of 2011 for its four
currently ongoing trials and begin the last new trial in January 2012.
President Byron also anticipated “one or more proceedings for
contempt of court and the hearings for preservation of evidence in
the cases of three fugitives under Rule 71 bis.” Ten fugitives remain
at large.
President Byron cited problems regarding resettlement of
acquitted persons and relocation of convicted persons who have
served their sentences. He cautioned: “The issue of the relocation of
[released convicts] needs urgent attention, as there will be many
persons in this position in the coming years. If this problem is not
dealt with in a comprehensive, long-term approach, the interests of
justice and the rule of law will not be served.” He called upon the
international community to help solve this long-term problem.
Finally, President Byron emphasized that the ICTR’s
progress has been severely hampered by staff retention issues and
projected that if the problem remains unaddressed, significant
additional delays could be expected: “In 2010, the Tribunal lost
almost 100 staff members. For the Chambers alone, the number is
19, representing a high percentage of our staffing level.” “If the
problem is not solved,” he warned, “we cannot exclude further
delays in judgments.”
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B. Dominique Ntawukulilyayo

On August 2, 2010, the Trial Chamber released its Judgment
and Sentence of Ntawukulilyayo, finding him guilty of only one
count of genocide and not guilty of complicity in genocide or direct
and public incitement of genocide. The Prosecutor decided not to
appeal the 25-year sentence.
How did the Prosecutor fail on so many counts of
genocide and why was there “insufficient evidence?” One
wonders whether the Prosecutor’s decision not to appeal the 25year sentence, rather than seek life imprisonment, stems from
his loss on the other counts or some larger strategy of sentencing
concerning genocide before the ICTR.
C. Callixte Kalimanzira (Convicted)

Callixte Kalimanzira was the former acting Minister of the
Interior. On October 20, 2010, the Appeals Chamber ruled on the
appeal from the Trial Chamber judgment convicting him of genocide
and sentencing him to 30 years imprisonment. Because almost all of
Kalimanzira’s convictions were reversed, the Appeals Chamber held
that this represented a significant reduction in his culpability, calling
for a revision of his sentence. However, it also noted that
Kalimanzira’s conviction for aiding and abetting genocide at Kabuye
Hill was affirmed, and therefore Kalimanzira remained convicted of
an extremely serious crime. The Appeals Chamber reduced his
sentence to 25 years imprisonment.
Standard of specificity for indictments: The Trial Chamber
found that vagueness in an indictment was “cured” by the summary
of a witness’s anticipated testimony, the witness’s prior statement,
and the Prosecution’s opening statement.
The Appeals Chamber found this was an error in law.
What are the standards for indictments?
Standard of de novo review by the Appeals Chamber of the
evidence: The Trial Chamber found Kalimanzira guilty of direct and
public incitement to genocide based in part on a speech he gave. The
Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had misconstrued
the testimony of witnesses, including other legal and factual errors,
and granted the Kalimanzira’s appeal on this point. One wonders
about the review of evidence/testimony that the Appeals Chamber
did not hear directly.
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What standard do they use to correctly construe that
testimony, to the point where they will overturn the Trial
Chamber’s interpretation?
The role of hearsay in international criminal courts: The
Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber’s lack of explanation
for accepting hearsay was an error of law, which made a witness’s
identification of Kalimanzira at the Gisagara Marketplace not
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
What is the role of hearsay in the courts, particularly
considering the time lapse between the events and the trial? And
if a court does not have the exclusionary rules regarding hearsay
that U.S. courts have, then what standard do they use to assign
weight, and is it really an error of law not to explain the Trial
Chamber’s reasoning in accepting hearsay evidence?
D. Emmanuel Rukundo

On October 20, 2010, the Appeals Chamber ruled, reducing
Rukundo’s sentence from 25 to 23 years imprisonment. The
Appeals Chamber reversed Rukundo’s conviction of committing
genocide by causing serious mental harm to a young female Tutsi
woman by sexually assaulting her. The Trial Chamber based its
inference of genocidal intent on a totality of the circumstances. The
Appeals Chamber reversed on the ground that the inference drawn
from the circumstantial evidence must be the only reasonable
inference available, and that here it was not. Judge Pocar dissented,
citing ICTY jurisprudence that even a purely sexual intent does not
preclude intent to harm, and that the rape/assault does not need to be
part of a systematic rape/sexual assault, but rather that the attack be
systematic.
Where does this leave the inclusion of rape as a basis for
genocide? Does this judgment undo some of the gains made by
the ICTY? How does the Appeals Judgment square with the
finding of rape as genocide in the confirmation of charges of
genocide against President Al Bashir in the Darfur situation
before the ICC?
E. Butare (Nyiramasuhuko et al.)

Right to an amicus curiae report on witness testimony: The
Trial Chamber ordered the Registrar to appoint an independent
amicus curiae to investigate the alleged false testimony of the
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witnesses and related allegations of contempt. In March 2009, the
Chamber directed the Registrar to appoint a new amicus curiae to
conduct a thorough investigation and to present a report to the
Chamber. The Defense requested a copy and was denied. The
Defense argued that the credibility of the witnesses and information
relating to the guilt of the accused are in the report, and to that end,
they should have access to this information to be able to fairly
defend their client(s).
Why wouldn’t the Trial Chamber release the report? Is
the Trial Chamber going too far into the civil law model and
hamstringing the Defense’s ability to do its job? If the concern is
retaliation of some sort by the accused, then what about
implementing some variant of the solution used in the
Guantanamo cases, where the accused is often not allowed to
have access to classified information that the defense lawyers can
access and use?
F. Yussuf Munyakazi

On July 5, 2010, the Trial Chamber found Munyakazi guilty
of genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity, but he
was found not guilty of complicity in genocide as the Chamber
found that the Prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Munyakazi participated in a joint criminal enterprise, as alleged
in the indictment. He was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.
Earlier, on March 17, 2010, the Trial Chamber granted the Defense
motion for a site visit and directed the Registry to make all necessary
arrangements to make the visits from May 30 to June 2, 2010.
However, on May 7, 2010, the Chamber deemed that a material
change in circumstances occurred and, having reviewed new
evidence, determined that they can assess the evidence without a site
visit, thus cancelling it.
What was the importance of a site visit for the Defense so
late in the proceedings? Why are site visits important to the
Defense, Prosecution, or judges? Has the ICTR often arranged
for site visits and has it been shown they help judges in arriving
at judgment?
G. The Arrest of Defense Counsel Peter Erlinder

Peter Erlinder is the lead counsel for Ntabakuze’s defense.
On May 28, 2010, he was arrested by Rwandan authorities on
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charges of “genocide denial.” Ntabakuze filed a motion for an
injunction against the Rwandan government regarding the arrest,
alleging that the “Prosecutor of Rwanda” made it clear that the
charges are directly connected statements Erlinder made outside
Rwanda, including in the course of Ntabakuze’s defense. At the
time of his arrest, Erlinder was in Rwanda on behalf of opposition
politician Victoire Ingabire, chairperson of the United Democratic
Forces political party, who had been seeking to run against President
Kagame. Ntabakuze argued that these charges “constitute
intimidation and serious interference with a legal process” and
directly impact his rights to a fair and expeditious trial. The Appeals
Chamber ordered the Registrar to obtain information regarding the
exact nature and basis of charges brought against Erlinder. There
was no response from Rwanda. On July 7, 2010, the Appeals
Chamber issued a further order requesting that the Rwandan
government provide it with such information within ten days of the
order. On July 15, 2010, the Registrar filed submissions indicating
that Rwanda had indicated that Erlinder had not been formally
charged and that he had been detained as a suspect pending ongoing
investigations. He was subsequently released on bail on health
grounds. On October 10, 2010, the Appeals Chamber granted
Ntabakuze’s motion for injunctions in part and issued a request for
Rwanda to “desist from proceeding against Erlinder in relation to
words spoken or written in the course of his representation of
Ntabakuze before the Tribunal.” The ICTR issued Erlinder
functional immunity with respect to statements made in his role as
counsel. However, the Appeals Chamber rejected the argument that
this immunity extends to statements made outside his ICTR role.
Only one month before he was arrested in Rwanda, Erlinder
had filed a wrongful death lawsuit in the western district court of
Oklahoma against President Kagame for the alleged assassination of
the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and his Burundian
counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira in 1994. The case was filed on
behalf of their widows. On May 22, 2010, six days before his arrest,
he vowed to “increasingly take the offensive” in reshaping the
history of what had happened in Rwanda.
Numerous ICTR defense lawyers threatened to boycott
proceedings before the ICTR in protest of Erlinder’s arrest.
What is the current status of Erlinder regarding both the
ICTR and the Rwandan government? Are Defense counsel
before the ICTR at heightened risk these days in light of the
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Rwandan government’s policies? What should be the proper
scope of functional immunity for Defense counsel? What kind of
impact has this matter had on defense work before the ICTR?
Was the ICTR too cautious in its response to the situation with
Erlinder?
H. Murder of Jwani Mwaikusa, Defense counsel for Yusef Munyakazi

On July 24, 2010, Jwani Mwaikusa, defense attorney at the
ICTR and law professor at the University of Dar es Salam, was
murdered outside his home in Tanzania. Munyakazi had been
convicted for genocide and crimes against humanity on June 30,
2010. He had planned to appeal the decision and his 25-year
sentence. Earlier in the year, Mwaikusa had blocked a motion by the
Rwandan government to transfer the trial of Munyakazi and three
other defendants from the ICTR in Tanzania to Rwanda. He
successfully argued that Rwanda lacked an independent judiciary
and that the defendants would not receive a fair trial there.
Is there any update on this murder case and its
implications for the ICTR and defense counsel in general?
I. ICTR Complaint to U.N. Security Council regarding lack of Kenyan
Cooperation

On June 18, 2010, Prosecutor Hassan Jallow told the U.N.
Security Council that Kenya has failed to cooperate with the ICTR in
capturing Felicien Kabuga, an indicted fugitive accused of financing
the 1994 genocide. “Despite the copious evidence of Kabuga’s
entry, residence, activities and occasional reported sightings of him
in that country, Kenya has neither arrested him nor provided the
information requested by the prosecutor to assist in the tracking and
arrest of this fugitive,” he said. Kabuga is the most wanted of 11
genocide suspects sought by the ICTR and still at large. The United
States has placed a $5 million bounty on his head.
Why is Kenya not cooperating with the ICTR regarding
the capture of Kabuga? What other difficulties is the ICTR
experiencing regarding efforts to track and apprehend other
indicted fugitives?
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IV. SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (CHIEF OF PROSECUTIONS
AND HEAD OF OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, JIM JOHNSON)

Charles Taylor Trial (Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor)
General Questions

Charles Taylor was under direct examination for 13 weeks in
2009 (and under cross examination for 11 weeks at the beginning of
2010). It has been said that both the Court and the Prosecution were
too lenient during the direct examination in allowing Taylor to
answer questions in long narratives, effectively recounting his life
beginning with his childhood. Taylor was allowed to discuss issues
that were not directly related to the questions asked, such as his role
in the Doe coup in 1980 and his escape from a Massachusetts jail in
1985. On occasion, some of Taylor’s arguably irrelevant answers
were even factually incorrect.
Considering the claim that this may have been a Defense
strategy to overwhelm judges with information, what was the
Prosecution’s strategy in dealing with a volume of irrelevant and
potentially incorrect information in cross-examination? How did
you draw the line between correcting all the information and
therefore adding to the volume of information to sift through,
and challenging Taylor’s credibility as a witness?
1. “Fresh Evidence” Part 1: The Legal Issue Decided in 2009

In November 2009, the Trial Chamber decided that the
Prosecution could introduce “fresh evidence,” which, in this Court,
refers to documents that the Prosecution wanted to use during crossexamination of Defense witnesses and that were not admitted during
the Prosecution’s case-in-chief. The decision concluded that fresh
evidence could be used to discredit Mr. Taylor’s testimony. The
Prosecution potentially could submit fresh evidence pointing to the
guilt of the Accused, but it had to be admitted under exceptional
circumstances and in the interests of justice, as determined on a caseby-case basis.
The legal issue is how (and whether) to distinguish between
evidence used for impeachment purposes and evidence used to prove
guilt. The Prosecution argued that allowing the admission of fresh
evidence after the close of the Prosecution’s case was normal
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practice; the Defense argued that doing so undermined Mr. Taylor’s
legal rights.
While allowing the use of fresh evidence, the Court agreed
with the Defense that the Accused is in a different position than
other witnesses, and that the court had to be particularly cautious in
distinguishing between fresh evidence that is intended solely for the
purpose of impeaching the Accused’s credibility and fresh evidence
that is probative of the guilt of the accused. The Court mainly
focused on the distinction between impeachment and proof of guilt,
while the Prosecution stressed a different distinction between merely
presenting fresh evidence in cross-examination and later admitting it
as evidence.
The Prosecution’s argument depended on a decision in the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) case (Trial Chamber
II allowed the Prosecution to use fresh evidence to impeach the
credibility of a witness, and later admitted the document into the
evidentiary record even though the document also went to prove the
guilt of the Accused) and on a recent Appeals decision in the ICTY
Prliü case, which allowed fresh evidence to be introduced during
cross-examination and also allowed that evidence to be admitted
later as probative of guilt of the Accused in exceptional
circumstances and in the interests of justice. The Defense argued that
the Accused in a trial, acting as a witness (as Taylor was in this
instance in his own trial), is in a different position from other
witnesses who testify, particularly in relation to specific rights
protected under Article 17 of the SCSL Statute, which provides for
the “Rights of the accused” and includes having adequate time and
facilities for preparation of his defense, to communicate with
counsel, and to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and
cause of the charge against him.
All documents the Prosecution planned to use had to be given
to the Defense by December 11, 2009. Documents only used for the
purposes of impeachment did not require prior disclosure to the
Defense. On the other hand, documents that could be probative of
Taylor’s guilt had to be disclosed to the Defense prior to use in
examination. Moreover, such probative fresh evidence would not be
allowed unless for use in cross-examination in the interest of justice
and unless its use did not violate Taylor’s fair trial rights.
To determine whether exceptional circumstances may allow
the Prosecution to use documents as fresh evidence, the Court
considered (a) when and how the Prosecution obtained the
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documents, (b) when the Prosecution disclosed the documents to the
Defense, and (c) why they were offered only after the Prosecution
closed its case.
During Taylor’s cross-examination, the Defense objected to
the admission of many documents presented by the Prosecution.
Examples included a three paragraph excerpt from the Sierra Leone
Truth and Reconciliation Report (one paragraph was allowed while
two were not), an article by Africa Confidential magazine allegedly
showing African leaders’ condemnation of Taylor (one sentence in
the third paragraph that was not probative of guilt was allowed), and
the IRIN West Africa Update 339 (allowed because nothing in the
two paragraphs went to guilt).
In early February 2010, the Court denied all of the
Prosecution’s applications for leave to appeal the January 2010 oral
decisions disallowing use of documents in cross-examination.
On one hand, it can be argued that the Court’s decision
effectively required the Prosecution to meet a higher burden
than that required at other tribunals, and before this same Trial
Chamber in the AFRC case; what are your reactions to this? On
the other hand, it seems that the Prosecution was pushing the
boundaries of the evidentiary rules by arguing the value of
certain evidence. On what basis do you feel that this argument
was justified? Is it common practice in civil law countries to
introduce evidence of culpability during a cross-examination?
What happens if the only way that the Prosecution can introduce
something related to guilt is through cross-examination of a
witness, supposing that they have no other witness that could lay
the foundation for that evidence? How does the fact that it is
Charles Taylor’s cross-examination at stake here come into
play? Should the evidentiary rules change depending on who is
being cross-examined?
2. “Fresh Evidence” Part 2: Naomi Campbell, Mia Farrow, Carole White
Media Frenzy

From January 2008 to February 2009, the Prosecution called
91 witnesses, formally closing its case in February 2009. In late June
2010, the Trial Chamber granted the Prosecution’s request to re-open
their case and call three additional witnesses (Naomi Campbell, Mia
Farrow, and Carole White) to testify in August 2010.
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In June, the Defense portrayed one witness as a high-ranked
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) member and close confidante to
Foday Sankoh, asserting the witness’s familiarity with RUF efforts
and goals and his awareness of any support for the RUF coming
from Taylor. The Witness consistently denied being aware of any
connection between Taylor and the RUF. This Witness’s testimony
opened the door for the Prosecution to request to re-open its case so
as to call Campbell, White, and Farrow.
The Prosecution had earlier attempted to introduce a
document in which actress Mia Farrow alleges that Taylor gave
supermodel Naomi Campbell a blood diamond at a dinner in South
Africa in 1997. At the time, the judges rejected the use of this
document, deciding that such “fresh evidence” was neither in the
interest of justice and was a violation of Taylor’s fair trial rights.
This purported allegation was first mentioned very early on during
the Prosecution’s cross-examination in January 2010.
In May, the Prosecution moved to re-open its case and hear
testimony from Campbell, White, and Farrow. The Prosecution
argued that the three witnesses were necessary to prove a central
issue: that Taylor possessed rough diamonds which he maintained to
buy arms. The Prosecution argued that jurisprudence from other
international criminal courts allows for the Prosecution to re-open
their case under certain limited circumstances: when the Prosecution
proves that the evidence, despite due diligence, could not have been
identified and presented in the case-in-chief. In the alternative, the
Prosecution requested that the evidence be presented in rebuttal
under Rule 85(A), where rebuttal evidence is allowed at the Court’s
discretion, but must relate to a significant issue arising directly out of
Defense evidence, which could not reasonably have been
anticipated. According to Trial Chamber II in the AFRC case, the
Prosecution must establish that the evidence arose extemporaneously
during the Defense case-in-chief that was unforeseeable, and that the
evidence has significant probative value to the determination of an
issue central to the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The Defense argued that the Court would not find the
anticipated evidence relevant to the charges against Taylor, that the
Prosecution failed to meet the legal standards required to re-open its
case or to provide evidence in rebuttal, and that allowing the
Prosecution to re-open its case now at such an advanced stage in trial
would prejudice the administration of justice. The Defense
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acknowledged that international jurisprudence did indeed recognize
a party’s right to be granted leave to reopen its case but only in
“exceptional circumstances,” which the Defense argued the
Prosecution failed to establish in this case. The Defense also argued
that subpoenaing Campbell would mainly generate media capital for
the proceedings and not evidentiary capital necessary to try the case
fairly.
In reply, the Prosecution argued that the SCSL Appellate
jurisprudence provides that the Prosecution must only show a
“reasonable basis” that the evidence is “likely to be” or that “there is
at least a good chance” it is of material assistance to the Prosecution.
The Court found the Prosecution’s request to re-open the case
as falling within the Court’s discretion, in that the probative value of
the proposed fresh evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
need to ensure a fair trial. The Trial Chamber was persuaded that the
Prosecution not only showed that it could not have obtained and
presented the fresh evidence during its case-in-chief, with reasonable
diligence, but that it also acted with such to obtain the evidence,
attempting to contact Campbell numerous times. The Trial Chamber
also found that the proposed fresh evidence was highly probative and
material to the indictment. The Defense could not be taken by
surprise because Farrows’ declaration was disclosed to the Defense
in December 2009, and the Defense would have the opportunity to
test the evidence on cross-examination and to make further
investigations.
The testimony of supermodel Naomi Campbell gathered
intense media scrutiny. Campbell testified that she had received dirty
stones that she did not know were diamonds or that they were from
Taylor until White and Farrow suggested that they were. Campbell
also agreed that White was a woman with a powerful motive to lie
about Campbell. During re-examination, the Prosecution asked
Campbell why she had previously declined to make public
comments about the alleged gift. When Campbell responded that she
had been afraid for her family, the Prosecution then asked whether
Campbell’s fear of the Accused also led her to deliver testimony that
was not entirely true. The Defense objected, arguing that the
Prosecution could not impeach its own witness, and the Judge
agreed. In response, the Prosecution attempted to classify Campbell
as a witness of the Court, and not a Prosecution witness because the
Prosecution had not had any contact with Campbell prior to her court
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appearance, but the Judge disagreed, as Campbell had been
subpoenaed at the Prosecution’s request.
Farrow’s account differed substantially from Campbell’s
with respect to the number and size of diamonds received and from
Campbell’s knowledge about from whom they came. In crossexamination, the Defense highlighted Farrow’s inability to recall
details, as well as her lack of personal knowledge of the events at
issue. Farrow acknowledged that she was not present when
Campbell received the diamonds. Moreover, her testimony alleging
that Campbell reported having one huge diamond was contradictory
to other statements. Defense concluded by attempted to portray
Farrow as biased against Taylor. Also, the Judges had their own
questions for her, including a question of whether Farrow got the
idea of a “huge diamond” from having seen the movie “Blood
Diamond.” Farrow responded that the movie had not influenced her.
White’s testimony also differed considerably from
Campbell’s. White claimed that during dinner, Campbell told her
that Taylor was going to give her diamonds. White testified that she
was present when Campbell received the diamonds from two men.
The Defense attempted to discredit her testimony by demonstrating
that she was biased against Campbell, using Facebook pages,
pictures, and commentary that suggested a “blood diamond” party
held at her office on the night of Campbell’s testimony.
This testimony, if credible, could be used to discredit
Taylor’s assertion that he did not possess blood diamonds, and
contributes to the proof of his culpability (in the assertion that he
did possess blood diamonds and used them to buy arms). Does
this mean that the distinction between the two types of evidence
from the court’s perspective is really only a theoretical
distinction? What are the practical applications of the Court’s
November decision on fresh evidence? What do you think the
Court should do when evidence satisfies both criteria?
Considering the timing and the fame-quotient of the three
additional witnesses, what are your reactions to the claim that
this was a clever ploy by the Prosecution to refocus the Court’s
attention and the world’s eye on its case, while disrupting the
flow of the Defense’s case? What was the actual value of the
testimony to the Prosecution’s case, considering the public
acrimony between the women and the discrepancies in the
testimony offered? In light of the facts that Campbell was at a
fundraiser at Taylor’s house, and the fame of the women and
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Taylor in 1997, how is it that the Prosecution only learned of the
evidence related to the gift of diamonds during the Defense’s
case-in-chief? What is your reaction to the claim that the
Prosecution had its chance to make its case with the other 91
witnesses? What are the positive and negative aspects of media
involvement in the Taylor case?
3. “Fresh Evidence” Part III: Sesay’s Custodial Statements and
Testimony

Defense likely hoped that Sesay’s testimony would
corroborate Taylor’s claims that he was not the commander of the
RUF and therefore not responsible for the crimes committed by the
RUF. Sesay’s testimony seemed to corroborate testimony of prior
Defense witnesses who claimed that Taylor withdrew his support of
the RUF in 1992, that the RUF respected civilians and did not recruit
children, obtained its weapons primarily from the United Liberation
Movement for Democracy in Liberia, and was controlled exclusively
by Foday Sankoh.
The Prosecution sought to use Sesay’s custodial statement
interview to impeach his testimony, but the Trial Chamber
unanimously denied the application for this use of fresh evidence as
it included information that could prove Taylor’s guilt in violation of
Taylor’s fair trial rights and not in the interests of justice. When the
Prosecution sought leave to appeal this decision, it was also denied.
Again, in order to be granted leave to seek interlocutory appeal of a
Trial Chamber decision, the moving party must show irreparable
prejudice and exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the Prosecution
again applied for disclosure of all witness statements in this period,
arguing that the statements differed significantly from his in-court
testimony. The Defense and Prosecution reiterated their arguments
from previous applications and objections. Moreover, consistent with
earlier decisions, the Trial Chamber dismissed this application for
disclosure. Nevertheless, the Prosecution relied heavily on the
summaries during cross examination, particularly of DCT-008, and
the Judges allowed the summaries into evidence as sought by the
Prosecution.
How damaging was the Trial Chamber’s denial of the
Prosecution’s application for such use of fresh evidence, and was
the denial of appeal reasonable?
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4. Disclosure of Witness Statements

The first nine defense witnesses testified between February
and April 2010. The first six focused on Taylor’s time in Libya, the
use of child soldiers, and how the RUF acquired guns and
ammunition, and much of their testimony was in closed session. The
primary legal issue during this period involved the Prosecution’s
requests for access to Defense witness statements and witness
summaries.
The Prosecution argued that the summaries provided by the
Defense for three witnesses were inadequate for the Prosecution to
prepares its cross examination of the witnesses, and that some
witness testimonies in court were inconsistent with the Defense
summaries. The Defense argued that the presumption of Rule 73ter
was that the Prosecution would receive summaries of a witness’s
statement, not the complete statements, and that Prosecution had to
prove by prima facie evidence that it would suffer undue or
irreparable prejudice should it not receive a witness statement for the
Court to order such disclosure. The Defense also argued that the
jurisprudence of the SCSL, ICTR, and ICTY supported its
contention that Defense witness summaries did not have to be as
detailed as Prosecution witness summaries given to the Defense.
The Court agreed with the principle laid down by the ICTY
Appeals Judgment in Prosecutor v. Tadiü, where the Chamber
decided that there was no blanket right for the Prosecution to see the
witness statement of a Defense witness. The Prosecution could only
apply for a disclosure, while the Chamber retained the discretion to
make case-by-case decisions.
The Court only granted one disclosure of a witness statement
for DCT-179, basing the decision on being in the interest of justice
due to the apparent contradiction between the information provided
in DCT-179’s witness summaries and his evidence-in-chief
regarding a period relevant to the indictment. In other requests for
disclosure, the Court mostly allowed the Prosecution additional time
to prepare their cross-examination.
What was the impact on the trial of the Court’s denial of
the Prosecution’s effort to gain greater access to the Defense
witness summaries?
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5. Prosecution Allegations and Strategies
i)

Summary of Prosecution Allegations

The Prosecution sought to undermine Taylor’s credibility as
a witness and focused primarily on Taylor’s claim that he was
appointed by the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) Committee of Five (a group of regional leaders
attempting to negotiate peace in Sierra Leone) to be the “point
president for peace” for the conflict of Sierra Leone. The
Prosecution attempted to point out flaws and inconsistencies in his
testimony, including the following, which Taylor denied:
a. That Taylor had lied about his involvement in the 1985 coup
to overthrow the then Liberian president Samuel Doe;
b. That Taylor lied about knowing rebel leader Foday Sankoh in
Libya during the 1980s;
c. That Taylor’s testimony regarding his decision to step down
from the Liberian presidency was not based upon the Greystone
attack, but rather from pressures by other West African leaders;
d. That he supplied arms and ammunition to rebels in return for
diamonds;
e. That he helped rebels plan certain operations during which
atrocities such as rape, murder, and amputation were committed;
f. That he had knowledge of rebel commander Sam Bockarie’s
public calls to kill Sierra Leoneans in Freetown if Foday Sankoh
was not released from jail;
g. That he participated in the operation of the attack in
Freetown;
h. That he sent fighters to destabilize the Ivory Coast;
i. That he ordered the execution of Sam Bockarie because he
knew that Bockarie had been indicted by the SCSL and he did
not want Bockarie in the hands of the Court;
j. That he systematically used child soldiers for combat;
k. That he stashed away huge amounts of Liberian government
money in foreign bank accounts;
l. That the NPFL did not have standards to mitigate widespread
abuses;
m. That amputations occurred in Liberia as they did in Sierra
Leone; and
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n. That he was responsible for the execution of several Liberian
politicians, including Jackson Doe, Gabriel Kpolleh, Moses
Duopoe, and Samuel Dokie.
ii) Prosecution Strategy Highlights

a. Questioning Taylor to demonstrate that he did not
have complete control over the whereabouts of the
documents of his personal presidential archives on which
the Defense heavily relied during direct-examination. By
questioning Taylor on the possibility that other
individuals may have had access to the documents, the
Prosecution attempted to show that the content of the
documents could have been compromised.
b. Questioning Taylor to suggest that he had tried to
benefit the RUF through his peace negotiations where the
conclusion of the Lome Agreement would transform the
RUF into a political party, affording the RUF all the
rights of a party, including the right to assembly and
amnesty covering crimes committed by the RUF.
c. Linking atrocities in Liberia by the NPFL soldiers to
those in Sierra Leone by the RUF to demonstrate that
Taylor was involved with the RUF.
d. Questioning Taylor on specific knowledge of alleged
NPFL crimes, including alleged crimes of his own family
members.
e. Questioning Taylor on his specific knowledge of the
use of child soldiers, police brutality, and mistreatment of
journalists, introducing media and articles including some
from the BBC and Amnesty International that reported on
the topics.
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6. Miscellaneous Legal Issues
i) Defense Request for Disclosure of Exculpatory Information on Witness
Payments

The Defense requested disclosure of exculpatory information
about some $30,000 paid by the Prosecution to Defense Witness
DCT-097 under Rule 68, arguing that this information tended to
prove that Taylor was not connected with RUF diamond trading.
According to the Defense, the Witness claimed that a Global Witness
employee had interviewed him in 2001 regarding his involvement
with the diamond trade and the RUF during the Sierra Leone
conflict. Purportedly, the Prosecution gave the Witness an allowance
during the period he was interviewed by the Prosecution; the
Witness claimed that the Prosecution stopped giving him the money
when they told him that he was not giving the Prosecution what it
needed. The Trial Chamber granted this motion in part, ruling that
the Prosecution must disclose information relating to payments made
to DCT-097, but that the Prosecution was not obligated to disclose
the alleged statement made by the Witness to the Global Witness.
The Court noted that Rule 68(B) does not limit disclosure of
exculpatory materials relating only to Prosecution witnesses, but is
broader. The Court concluded that the Defense failed to make a
prima facie case showing that the Global Witness statement existed,
or that the alleged statement met the other elements of the test for
mandated disclosure. Adopting the view of the ICTR in Karemera,
the Court found that because the Prosecution did not contest the
contents of the money transfers and because the funds were
transferred by Prosecution employees, the Prosecution should have
disclosed information about the transfers to the Defense.
In a separate issue relating to witness payments and a
subsequent charge of abuse of process made by the Defense against
the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber ordered Prosecutors to disclose
exculpatory evidence in their possession that suggests that Charles
Taylor did not order the execution of Johnny Paul Koroma, the
former leader of Sierra Leon’s military junta, the AFRC. The factual
issue of Koroma’s death is still at issue as the Defense argued that
Koroma, who worked with the RUF rebels to bring down the
government, may be alive.
The Court’s order granted the Defense’s September 24, 2010,
motion for disclosure, in which the Defense alleged that the witness
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involved was previously a potential Prosecution witness who had
received payments to cooperate with investigators and who later
became a Defense witness. The Defense argued that the benefits
given to the witnesses were meant to induce them to give false
testimony against Taylor. The witness himself admitted to defense
lawyers that he was making up the story to get money from the
Prosecution. The witness was allegedly a subordinate who carried
out the murder of Koroma, on order by Taylor as an individual who
had knowledge of his dealings with Sierra Leonean rebel forces.
The Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecution to disclose
materials regarding an investigation by the Prosecution into the
alleged death of Koroma, including DNA tests on corpses, records of
disbursements made to Defense witness DCT-032, and an original
duplicate copy of indemnity against the Prosecution before the
Special Court. However, the Trial Chamber had at the time declined
to draw adverse inferences from the Prosecution’s failure to comply
with Rule 68(B), holding that since the potentially exculpatory
material had not yet been disclosed, such a request was premature.
After the exculpatory material was disclosed by the Prosecution, the
Defense moved again for the Trial Chamber to draw an adverse
inference from the disclosed material against the Prosecution
allegations and evidence that Taylor was responsible in any way for
the alleged death of Koroma in Liberia.
The Trial Chamber dismissed this motion to draw adverse
inferences against the Prosecution’s allegations and evidence that the
Accused was responsible in any way for the alleged death of Koroma
in light of the Prosecution’s failure to comply with Rule 68(B). The
Court reasoned that the Defense failed to demonstrate that any
material prejudice flowed from the Prosecution’s failure to comply
with the Rule, that the failure to comply was not done in bad faith,
and that the adverse inference sought is not available on the material
relied upon, which does not go so far as to establish that the evidence
of the Prosecution witnesses relating to Koroma’s death could not be
believed.
However, the Court granted the Defense’s motion for leave
to appeal this dismissal, finding that the Defense met the conjunctive
conditions of exceptional circumstances and irreparable prejudice
that cannot be easily remedied in final appeal as prescribed by Rule
73(b), which governs the test for granting an interlocutory appeal. A
decision on the appeal has yet to be made.
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The issue of the Prosecution’s payment to witnesses
seemed to come up a couple of times in this case, both in 2009
and 2010. While the issue in 2010 did not seem to be particularly
controversial per se, has it become a theme in the Court's
jurisprudence?
ii) Defense Motion for Investigation of Prosecution for Abuse of
Process/Contempt of Court

In September 2010, the Defense first alleged abuse of process
for the manner in which the Prosecution had conducted its
investigations, and moved for relief in the form of an independent
investigation into the OTP and its investigators under Rule 77. The
Defense cited an SCSL Appeals Chamber holding that the standard
for an independent investigation into contempt is not of a prima facie
case, which is the standard for committal for trial, but instead a
different and lower standard of “reason to believe” that an offense
may have been committed, a pre-condition for ordering an
independent investigation. The Defense alleged that the Prosecutor
was responsible for assaulting potential witnesses or suspects,
exerting undue pressure by threats, harassment, and intimidation, and
offering or providing improper payments, benefits, or other
incentives. The Defense sought investigation into the conduct of the
Prosecution in relation to witnesses and potential witnesses in this
case as well as for payments and benefits offered and/or paid by the
Prosecution to witnesses. The Prosecution denied all allegations and
sought to dismiss the motion on two counts: first, that it was filed
untimely, and second, that it failed to establish that there is any
credible reason to believe that any member of the Prosecution had
been involved in conduct that would constitute “contempt of court,”
arguing for a narrow construction of Rule 77. The Defense replied
by suggesting that the Special Court and ICTY Rules were
distinguished on grounds that ICTY Rules were limited to three
categories of witnesses whereas the Special Court deliberately
included a fourth category not provided for in the ICTY Rules,
namely, “potential witnesses.” The Court eventually orally dismissed
this motion in October 2010, and gave its reasoning in a December
2010 decision.
Rule 77 sets out the law and procedure for dealing with
contempt of the Special Court. The Appeals Chamber has stated that
the standard of proof in determining whether an independent
investigation should be ordered into a matter of contempt is not that



278

ATROCITY CRIMES LITIGATION YEAR-IN-REVIEW

[Vol. 9

of a prima facie case, the standard for committal for trial, but a
different and lower standard of “reason to believe” that the offense
may have been committed. Notwithstanding the lower standard of
proof, an allegation of contempt must still be credible enough to
provide a Judge or Trial Chamber with “reason to believe” that a
person may be in contempt. The Trial Chamber found against the
Defense on the timing for bringing the alleged misconduct to the
attention of the Trial Chamber, and under the ambit of Rule 77.
Specifically, the Defense’s application amounted to a request for an
audit of the Prosecution’s operations since the inception of the
Special Court in 2002, which is a remedy too general and which does
not fall within the ambit of Rule 77. Instead, Rule 77 is concerned
about the conduct of individuals who have allegedly committed
contempt and must be targeted at an individual engaging in specific
conduct that the moving party must identify in greater detail and in
accordance with the “reason to believe” standard. The Trial Chamber
found no reason to believe that members of the Prosecution willfully
interfered with the administration of justice or otherwise engaged in
contemptuous conduct as identified in Rule 77 and so dismissed the
Defense’s motion.
However, the Court also granted the Defense’s motion for
leave to appeal the previously denied motion for the investigation
into contempt, finding that the Defense met the conjunctive
conditions of exceptional circumstances and irreparable prejudice
that cannot be easily remedied in final appeal as prescribed by Rule
73(b), which governs the test for granting an interlocutory appeal. A
decision on an appeal has yet to be made.
Any comment on this direct assault by the Defense on the
conduct of the Prosecution?
V. EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF
CAMBODIA (INTERNATIONAL DEPUTY CO-PROSECUTOR WILLIAM
SMITH)
TRIAL 001

On July 26, 2010, the Trial Chamber issued its judgment in
the case of Kaing Guek Eav Alias Duch (Case No. 001). On August
16, 2010, the Co-Prosecutors filed an appeal against the judgment of
the trial chamber convicting Duch of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and crimes against humanity. On August 24, 2010, Co-



2011]

DAVID SCHEFFER

279

Lawyers for Duch filed an appeal of the Trial Chamber’s July 26,
2010, judgment, asking the Supreme Court Chamber to set aside the
Trial Court judgment and acquit Duch.
Main Legal Issues from the Judgment
1. Cumulative Convictions – Crimes Against Humanity

This is the first of three grounds for the Prosecution’s appeal.
Because Duch’s actions formed the basis for multiple convictions for
crimes against humanity and war crimes, the Chamber had to
consider the effect of the cumulative convictions. In doing so, the
Chamber applied the Celebici test from the ICTY. This test turns on
whether the statutory provisions of multiple criminal convictions
have materially distinct elements from each other. After applying
this test, the Chamber found that extermination was found to
encompass murder and the one instance of rape was included in
torture. The Chamber also found that persecution on political
grounds encompassed extermination, enslavement, imprisonment,
torture, and other humane acts.
In their Notice of Appeal, the Co-Prosecutors argued that the
Chamber erred in subsuming all of these crimes against humanity in
that of persecution on political grounds, and therefore erred in not
convicting Duch cumulatively for all of the crimes against humanity.
In subsuming the crimes, the Chamber based its judgment on the
Kordiü Appeal Judgement, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Schomburg and Judge Güney on Cumulative Convictions,
paragraphs 10 and 12 (noting that where persecution requires the
materially distinct elements of a discriminatory act and a
discriminatory intent, it is therefore more specific than murder or
other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity, and further noting
that convictions for imprisonment and persecution are impermissibly
cumulative. Where persecution takes the form of imprisonment, the
former subsumes the latter (citations omitted)). This is despite the
fact that it seems that the majority of the judges in that Chamber
entered cumulative convictions for persecution and other crimes
against humanity.
The Prosecution’s appeal further alleges that the Trial Court
erred by characterizing the crime against humanity of rape as torture
and not convicting Duch of the two distinct crimes (crime against
humanity of rape and crime against humanity of torture) separately.
The Chamber found Duch criminally liable for torture. However, the
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Chamber noted that in 1975, “torture” required the involvement of a
State official, and therefore this requirement was applied in Duch’s
case. Torture occurred in the interrogation techniques used in S-21
and S-24, the rape of a detainee, and “other inhumane acts” inflicted
on detainees. The Chamber noted that rape is a separate offense
from torture both under Article 5 of the ECCC Law and international
criminal law. However, the Chamber found that in this case, the act
committed met the legal elements of both rape and torture.
Did the Trial Chamber go too far in the way that it
subsumed crimes within each other? Should it have instead
entered cumulative convictions? What is the practical difference
and effect between cumulative and subsumed convictions?
2. Sentencing Issues/Court’s Discretion

In sentencing Duch, the Chamber noted that there is not an
international sentencing regime that applied to the ECCC. With one
dissenting judge, the majority stated that the sentencing would draw
from international and Cambodian sentencing principles. Notably,
one of the most prominent principles guiding the sentencing was that
its purpose was to punish the accused, not to seek revenge. This is
notable because of the outcry from civil parties and people in
Cambodia and abroad who think the sentence is too light.
What was the argument made by the dissenting judge on
the sentencing principles?
In the aftermath of the sentence, many commentators
expressed doubt that the sentence was heavy enough to punish Duch
and deter future war criminals. Drawing from the Rome Statute and
Cambodian 2009 Penal Code, the Chamber announced that it would
apply one single sentence for Duch’s multiple convictions.
According to Deputy International Co-Prosecutor William Smith, the
parole provisions under national law should not apply to Duch
because he was convicted by an international tribunal. Furthermore,
Smith stated that there is no parole possibility under the ECCC
because the ECCC expressly declined to include parole provisions
that other internationals tribunals may have.
How difficult was it for the Co-Prosecutors to agree on
the factors for an appeal regarding the sentence issue? What
most influenced the decision to appeal on this issue?
The Chamber refused to find that duress and following orders
were mitigating factors. However, the Chamber did give “limited
weight” to the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) government’s coercive
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environment under which Duch operated as an officer of the
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). The Chamber also found
Duch’s cooperation with the ECCC a mitigating factor because it
aided “national reconciliation,” which was one of the goals of
establishing the ECCC. Finally, Duch’s “propensity for
reconciliation” was also given limited weight by the Chamber.
Citing Duch’s failure to fully admit responsibility for his actions and
his last-minute request for acquittal, the Chamber stated that any
remorse that may have been a mitigating factor was undermined,
diminishing the extent to which it may have been considered
(although it apparently did not diminish it completely).
Why should the Chamber have accorded any mitigating
value to the DK government’s “coercive environment?” Isn’t
that a normal phenomenon in atrocity situations? Didn’t Duch
fatally undermine the mitigating advantage for cooperation
when he sought “release” and “acquittal?”
Duch’s sentence was further mitigated by his unlawful
detention by the Cambodian Military Court for more than eight
years. Drawing reasoning from the ICTR, a majority of the Chamber
found that Duch’s unlawful detainment entitled him to a reduction of
five years from his sentence. Notably, the Chamber stated that
“neither the gravity of the crimes . . . nor the constraints under which
the Cambodian legal system was operating . . . can justify these
breaches of the Accused’s rights.” The majority sentenced Duch to
35 years. The 35 years was further reduced by the five-year
compensation for Duch’s unlawful detention and for the time he
spent in detention under the ECCC since July 31, 2007, thus
reducing the sentence to be served to 19 years.
Should we understand that there really was no
disagreement by anyone—the Prosecution, Defense, Judges—
about the need to mitigate Duch’s sentence in light of the eightyear detention in the Cambodian Military Court? Does this
mean that under no circumstances can the Appeals Chamber
seriously consider a life sentence for Duch?
The Prosecution’s appeal alleges that the Trial Court erred in
its sentencing discretion by “giving insufficient weight to the gravity
of the ‘crimes of a particularly shocking and heinous character’
committed by Duch, his role and willing participation in those
crimes and, other aggravating circumstances; and giving undue
weight to the mitigating circumstances.” The appeal also alleges that
the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber is arbitrary and
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inadequate and that the Trial Chamber “committed an error of law…
by failing to consider the relevant international sentencing law and
the range of sentences available to it in cases similar to this.”
This is also the second ground for the Defense’s appeal that
the Supreme Court acquit Duch, stating that the Court erred in the
determination of a single prison sentence of 35 years. The appeal
argues that Duch should be designated a witness to the events during
the Democratic Kampuchea regime. The appeal argues that the Trial
Court violated Rule 87 of the ECCC internal rules by failing to
examine the question of its personal jurisdiction, “solely on the
grounds that the Defense preliminary objections were raised late.”
How well does this sentence conform with the sentences
meted out to others found guilty of similar crimes in other
international criminal courts?
Explain how the issue of
“gravity” figures so prominently in the Co-Prosecutors’ appeal
and in the analysis of many commentators of the Trial Chamber
judgment.
3. Error in Defining Enslavement

This is the third ground for the Prosecution’s appeal, which
alleges that the Trial Chamber erred in failing to convict Duch of
enslavement because it used an erroneous definition of the crime
against humanity of enslavement. The Chamber found that no fewer
than 12,272 persons died at S-21 and S-24. Due to the massive
scale, the Chamber found that the deaths and executions of the
detainees amounted to murder and extermination. The Chamber also
found that the detainees of S-21 were subjected to enslavement
(which was meant in this case to be forced labor. . . “coupled with
detention”), imprisonment, torture, other inhumane acts, and
persecution on political grounds. With regard to enslavement, the
Co-Prosecutors claim in their Notice of Appeal that the Chamber had
relied on an incorrect definition of enslavement by making “forced
labour an essential element of enslavement.”
4. No Procedure to Allow a Guilty Plea

The Trial Chamber noted that unlike other international
tribunals, the ECCC does not allow a defendant to plead guilty. As a
result, the Chamber heard all issues related to the charges, even if the
issues were not in dispute. Further, in only a few short paragraphs,
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the Chamber rejected Duch’s defenses that he: 1) acted under duress
and 2) was only following superior orders of the DK government.
How should the Court handle a defendant who essentially
pleads guilty, when there is no mechanism for a guilty plea in the
rules of procedure and evidence?
5. Lack of Jurisdiction over Cambodia Diminishes the Meaningful
Participation of Civil Parties

After convicting Duch of crimes against humanity of
persecution and the above-listed war crimes under the Geneva
Conventions, the Trial Chamber turned to whether Duch could be
held responsible for the injuries of two categories of Civil Parties.
The two categories of Civil Parties were survivors of S-21 and S-24,
and relatives of detainees of S-21 and S-24. The Chamber found that
66 Civil Parties had established their claim to be immediate victims
of S-21 or S-24, or to have proved the existence of immediate
victims of S-21 or S-24 and close kinship in relation to them. The
death of these victims caused demonstrable injury and this harm was
a direct consequence of Duch’s actions. The Trial Chamber granted
the request of these Civil Parties that their names be included in the
judgment. The Chamber rejected nearly all Civil Party reparation
claims on the grounds of lacking specificity or as being beyond the
scope of available reparations before the ECCC. The Trial Chamber
did agree to order the compilation and publication of all statements
of apology made by the Accused during the trial, but rejected that
statements made by Civil Parties be included.
In rejecting nearly all of the Civil Parties’ requests for
reparations, the Trial Chamber recognized that, unlike regional
human rights’ courts such as the European Court of Human Rights,
the ECCC does not have jurisdiction to compel the Cambodian
government or its national authorities to contribute monies to
reparations.
What will be the effect of the handling of Civil Parties in
the Duch trial on future ICC cases? What are the lessons to be
learned, and what is the ECCC doing right, and wrong, in its
dealings with Civil Parties in Trial 002? What's the point of
being a Civil Party if all you get is your name published in the
judgment, and the tribunal/court (whether it be the ECCC, or
the ICC) has no real enforcement authority? Could the Trial
Chamber have determined more innovative remedies for the
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Civil Parties, including some that had been suggested by lawyers
for the Civil Parties during the Duch trial?
6. The ECCC’s Personal Jurisdiction over Duch

This is the first ground for the Defense’s appeal asking the
Supreme Court Chamber to set aside the Trial Court judgment
against Duch and acquit him.
The Defense appeal argues that the Trial Court erred in
finding that it had ratione personae jurisdiction over Duch.
[The appeal alleges that the Trial Chamber] …failed
to demonstrate why it was convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Prosecution evidence on
which it relied proved that the Accused fell under its
personal jurisdiction. In reality, in light of his official
functions at the relevant time, the Accused does not
fit into the category of persons under the jurisdiction
of the ECCC.
The Defense appeal further argues that the Trial Chamber
erred by applying international customary law inconsistent with the
ECCC law.
[It alleges that t]he Trial Chamber gave preference to
common law principles at the detriment of the civil
law principles recognized under the civil law system
in effect in Cambodia. Such interpretation amounts to
a violation of Article 2(1) of the Agreement between
the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia concerning the prosecution under
Cambodian law of crimes committed during the
period of Democratic Kampuchea, of Articles 1 and
2(new) of the ECCC law and of the civil law judicial
system in effect in Cambodia.
How can the Defense raise the issue of personal
jurisdiction on appeal?
Describe how the Trial Chamber addressed this issue
long before closing arguments and the July 26, 2010, judgment,
and arguably denied the Defense counsel the opportunity to raise
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it so late in the proceedings and again on appeal. Did Duch’s
lawyers do themselves any favor with the judges by challenging
personal jurisdiction in the manner in which they did?
TRIAL 002
7. Background

On September 15, 2010, the Co-Investigating Judges issued
the Closing Order that indicted four Khmer Rouge leaders: Nuon
Chea, the party’s chief ideologue; Ieng Sary, the foreign minister;
Ieng Thirith, the social affairs minister; and Khieu Samphan, the
party’s head of state.
The indictment charges that between April 17, 1975, and
January 6, 1979, defendants, through their acts or omissions,
committed (via a joint criminal enterprise), planned, instigated,
ordered, or aided and abetted, or are responsible by virtue of superior
responsibility, for the following crimes:
(1) Crimes Against Humanity: (a) murder; (b)
extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e)
imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecution on
political, racial, and religious grounds; (i) other
inhumane acts…(Closing order, p. 370).
(2) Genocide, in killing members of Vietnamese and Cham
groups. Defined as, "acts of killing, committed with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group as such."
(3) Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949: (a) willful killing; (b) torture or inhumane
treatment; (c) willfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health; (d) willfully depriving a
prisoner of war or civilian the rights of fair and regular
trial; (e) unlawful deportation or unlawful confinement
of a civilian.
(4) Violations of the 1956 Penal Code of Cambodia: (a)
homicide; (b) torture; and (c) religious persecution.
The Closing Order (p. 276) reads:
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The Co-Investigating Judges find there is sufficient
evidence that the Charged Persons, Nuon Chea, Ieng
Sary, Khieu Samphan, and Ieng Thirith committed the
crimes listed in this Closing order through their
membership in the Joint Criminal Enterprise and their
contribution to the common purpose…Further, the
Charged Persons not only shared with the other
members of the Joint Criminal Enterprise the intent
that these crimes be committed as part of the common
purpose, they were the driving force behind it.
How do you assess the Closing Order?
8. Continued Detention

The Co-Investigating Judges decided in the Closing Order of
September 15, 2010, to continue the detention for all four
defendants, despite their advanced age and in some cases, failing
health. Their reasoning for each:
a. Ieng Sary: to ensure his presence at trial, to
protect his security, and to preserve public
order.
b. Ieng Thirith: to ensure her presence at trial,
preserve public order and avert the risk of
Thirith exerting pressure on witnesses or
victims.
c. Khieu Sampham (Hem): to ensure the
presence of Hem at trial, protect the security
of Hem, preserve public order and avert the
risk of Hem exerting pressure on witnesses or
victims or destroying evidence if released.
d. Nuon Chea: in order to ensure the presence of
Chea at trial, protect his security, preserve
public order and avert the risk of Chea
exerting pressure on witnesses or victims or
destroying evidence if released.
Nuon Chea applied for provisional release because
Cambodian Law does not allow provisional detention to exceed three
years. His application was dismissed. The Prosecution argued that
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he should not be released in light of “the complexity of the case, the
seriousness of the charges and the diligence of the Court to date.”
The Co-Investigating Judges disagreed with the Defense’s
interpretation of the applicable Cambodian law, and found that the
Internal Rules do not limit provisional detention to three years and
that it was necessary to maintain Nuon Chea (and the rest of the
indicted) in Provisional Detention until they appear before the Trial
Chamber, pursuant to Internal Rule 68.
9. Appeals Against the Closing Order/Challenges to ECCC Jurisdiction

Each of the accused filed an appeal in the Pre-Trial Chamber
against the Closing Order, claiming that the Co-Investigating Judges
erred by charging them with genocide, crimes against humanity,
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and with joint criminal
enterprises as a mode of liability. They argued that these crimes and
joint criminal enterprise were not part of the law applicable in
Cambodia during 1975-1979—the relevant period of the court’s
jurisdiction. Thus, they assert, the charges violate the principle of
legality, which holds that a person can only be charged with crimes
that were clearly established as such at the time of the alleged
commission.
The argument is premised on the claim that
the ECCC is a domestic court that must apply
Cambodian law, and that domestic criminal law
between 1974 and 1979 did not provide for the
criminalization of genocide, crimes against humanity,
or war crimes. Further, they argue that joint criminal
enterprise was not a mode of liability recognized in
Cambodia during the relevant time. Counsel for Ieng
Sary also claims that a pardon, given to him in 1996
by the King of Cambodia when he renounced his
allegiance to Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, bars the
claims against him, and that neither command
responsibility nor aiding and abetting are appropriate
modes of liability before the ECCC because they
were not part of established Cambodian law by 1979.
(Ieng Thirith Appeal from the Closing Order, page
14).
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On January 13, 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed and
partially amended the indictments against Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith,
Khieu Samphan, and Nuon Chea. The Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the
Accused Persons to be sent for trial and to continue to be held in
provisional detention until they are brought before the Trial
Chamber. The indictments continue to include charges of crimes
against humanity, genocide, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and murder, torture and religious persecution as defined
by the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code. The Pre-Trial Chamber found
that the appeal filed by Khieu Samphan was inadmissible, whereas
the appeals filed by Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Nuon Chea were
found to be admissible in part. Of the admissible parts, the Pre-Trial
Chamber dismissed all the grounds of appeal with two exceptions.
First, the Pre-Trial Chamber ordered that the Closing Order be
amended with a specification for the requirement of the existence of
a link between the underlying acts of crimes against humanity and an
armed conflict. Second, the Pre-Trial Chamber also found that rape
did not exist as a crime against humanity in its own right in the
period 1975-1979, but that rape could be considered as “other
inhumane acts” within the legal definition of crimes against
humanity. The Closing Order was amended accordingly.
Currently, the trial against the four leaders of the CPK is set
to begin in mid-2011. It is feasible that the Trial Chamber could
hold its initial hearing within the first quarter of 2011 and set a date
for opening the trial within the first half of 2011.
What are the views of the OTP about the PTC decision of
January 13, 2011, regarding the appeal? Why did the PTC
require a link between crimes against humanity and an armed
conflict? How will the finding on rape as an “other inhumane
act” affect the Prosecution?
10. Civil Party Participation and Reparations in the Wake of Trial 001

The ECCC is the first hybrid court to provide a role for Civil
Parties in criminal proceedings (recognizing that the ICC also
provides for a role). ECCC Internal Rule 23(1) provides that the
purpose of Civil Party action is to (a) participate in criminal
proceedings against those responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ECCC by supporting the Prosecution; and (b)
allow victims to seek collective and moral reparations.
The investigating judges received and reviewed 4,128
applications from persons claiming to be victims of crimes
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committed by the accused. They admitted 2,123 of the applicants as
civil parties—victims recognized by the Court as parties to the
proceedings who are allowed to claim collective and moral
reparations. They rejected the remaining applications for a variety of
reasons, most commonly because the applicant did not establish that
his or her injury was related to a specific crime or crime-site
included within the scope of the investigation.
In Trial 002, the ECCC is under pressure to find more
creative and symbolic solutions to the issue of reparations, should
the accused be found guilty. Deputy Prime Minister Sok An said,
“People have to have something to take away and be proud of this
court; to be proud of the trial…If the reparations after this second
case are similar to the first case (Duch case), then most victims will
not be satisfied. If the reparations are still the same, I think it will not
be successful.”
Considering the result in Trial 001, what meaningful
“collective and moral reparations” can this court offer the
victims who participate?
The seventh plenary session of the ECCC took place between
February 2 and 9, 2010, and resulted in amended Internal Rules
creating two Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers to coordinate with all
Civil Party Lawyers and victims. The amendments were adopted to
streamline civil society participation and accommodate the large
number of civil parties participating in Trial 002. The Lead CoLawyers will be responsible for overall advocacy, strategy, and incourt presentation of the interests of all Civil Parties. The new rule
scheme “is intended to balance the rights of all parties, to safeguard
the ability of the ECCC to achieve its mandate while maintaining
Civil Party participation, and to enhance the quality of Civil Party
representation.”
A second set of amendments focused on reparations seeking
to “open additional avenues through which reparations can be paid,
such as third-party funds, to ensure that victims still receive
reparations even if the convicted person is indigent or refuses to
comply.”
In August 2010, the Co-Investigating Judges began to release
their first decisions on the admissibility of Civil Parties in Trial 002
after a review of 3,988 applications. Due to the large number of
victims seeking to participate, the Internal Rules were amended to
provide that decisions on the admissibility of such parties must be
made during the judicial investigation and, at least, by the Closing
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Order. This was accomplished by September 15, 2010, when the
Closing Order was issued.
If Trial 002 is set to begin in early to mid-2011, has this
procedure provided the victims with enough opportunity to
submit their applications to participate? What appeals process,
if any, is there for victims who have submitted their appeal in a
timely fashion and been denied?
11. Political Interference

On September 9, 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ECCC
issued the “Second Decision on Nuon Chea’s And Ieng Sary’s
Appeal Against OCIJ Order on Requests to Summons Witnesses,”
dismissing the request by lawyers for Ieng Sary and Nuon Chea for
an investigation into alleged political interference by the Cambodian
government in the Court. The appeal was dismissed due to the
failure to achieve the vote of a super-majority of judges.
i)

Procedural History

Beginning in November 2008, Co-Lawyers for Nuon Chea
and Ieng Sary filed several “Requests for Investigative Action” or
“Rule 35 Requests,” asking that the Office of Co-Investigating
Judges (OCIJ) interview current and former members of the Royal
Government of Cambodia in hopes of finding “documents and
information relevant to the pending judicial investigation . . . some
of which may be exculpatory” in anticipation of Trial 002. The
lawyers for Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary filed the requests in response
to public allegations of political interference, Hun Sen’s public
remarks regarding potential ECCC witnesses, the RCG’s official
position with respect to six summoned officials, and other events. In
response to the Requests, the OCIJ issued summonses and received
no response. The OCIJ refused to use coercive measures to compel
appearances of the witnesses and dismissed the requests on January
13, 2010. On March 15 and 16, 2010, Co-Lawyers for Ieng Sary and
Nuon Chea issued appeals to the Pre-Trial Chamber in response to
the dismissal. On June 8, 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued its
response directing the Co-Investigating Judges to “reconsider the
Requests in light of the correct interpretation of Internal Rule 35,”
but confirmed “the decision by the International Co-Investigating
Judge [CIJ] that implementing coercive measures against the six
summoned officials would unduly delay the conclusion of the
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judicial investigation.” “The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the CIJs
had incorrectly interpreted Internal Rule 35 which had led to an error
of law.” That is, the CIJs interpreted Rule 35 as having application
only “once evidence can be deduced that the CIJs have failed to
exercise their power or perform a particular function as a
consequence of interference . . . ”
In response, the CIJs filed the “Impugned Reconsideration”
affirming their original decision. The CIJs reconsidered the request
with the “purpose of ascertaining whether there might be any link
between statements by members of the Cambodian government and
the decision of witnesses not to appear,” and again found that the
allegations did not warrant application of Rule 35. Finally, the CoLawyers for Nuon Chea filed a response to the Impugned
Reconsideration asking that the Pre-Trial Chamber “investigate
whether comments made by Kong Sam, Khieu Kanharith, and others
in the Royal Government of Cambodia may have impacted the
ability or willingness of these witnesses summoned by the
International Co-Investigating Judges to participate in interviews”
and to take appropriate action, including instructing the OCIJ to
carry out the investigative actions requested in the Rule 35 Request.
ii) September 9, 2010, PTC Decision

The Pre-Trial Chamber failed to reach a super majority
decision on whether or not the Co-Investigating Judges erred in
failing to conclude that material placed before them gave rise to a
reason to believe that an interference pursuant to Internal Rule 35(1)
may have occurred.
Rule 35 provides that the ECCC “may sanction or refer to
appropriate authorities, any person who knowingly and willfully
interferes with the administration of justice,” including anyone who
“threatens, intimidates…or otherwise interferes with a witness.”
Rule 35 is “demonstrably” similar to Rule 77 of the ICTY. The PreTrial Chamber explicitly adopted that court’s approach to ICTY Rule
77 in its application of ECCC Rule 35 here. Unlike Rule 77 of the
ICTY, however, Rule 35 provides that the accused must act with the
mens rea elements of knowingly and willfully. That is “it must be
demonstrated that the accused acted willfully and knowingly and
with the knowledge that his conduct was likely to deter or influence
a witness or potential witness.”
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iii) Joint Dissenting Opinion of International Judges Catherine MarchiUhel and Rowan Downing

The two international judges on the PTC filed a strong
dissent arguing for intervention: “As a result of the repeated failure
of the CIJs to act, we are of the view that given the grave nature of
the allegations of interference the Pre-Trial Chamber must
intervene.” They argued:
In surveying this material [supporting the allegations
of possible interference with the administration of
justice] we are of the view that no reasonable trier of
fact could have failed to consider that the [relevant]
facts and their sequence constitute a reason to believe
that one or more members of the [Royal Government
of Cambodia] may have knowingly and willfully
interfered with witnesses who may give evidence
before the CIJs…The comment by [government
spokesman] Khieu Kanharith [“that [the]
government’s position was that [the six government
officials] should not give testimony”] satisfies us that
there is a reason to believe he, or those he speaks on
behalf of, may have knowingly and willfully
attempted to threaten or intimidate the Six Officials,
or otherwise interfere with the decision of the Six
Officials related to the invitation to be interviewed by
the International Co-Investigating Judge.
The two international judges argued that the “most suitable
course of action would be to conduct further investigations to
ascertain whether there are sufficient grounds to instigate
proceedings.” The judges based their decision on both the right to a
fair trial and the need to uphold the integrity of judicial proceedings.
[Though the international judges’ dissenting opinion
did not prevail, it] is a healthy sign that the strong
arguments advanced by those judges are being
transparently demonstrated even though such
arguments did not prevail at this stage of the
proceedings. It is always possible that the Trial
Chamber or even the Supreme Court Chamber in
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Trial 002 will have an opportunity to revisit the issue
and be persuaded by the dissenting judges’ views.
(David Scheffer).
iv) Majority Opinion of Cambodian Judges Prak Kimsan, Ney Thol, and
Huot Vuthy

The three Cambodian judges argued for dismissal of the
appeal: “The statements of the spokesperson, Mr. Khieu Kanharith,
cannot obstruct, prevent, or threaten directly or even indirectly the
appearance of the six high-ranking officials before this Court.”
Accordingly, they held that the Second Order by the CIJs reflects a
“proper exercise of [the CIJs] discretion.”
Isn’t there a back story to this entire saga regarding the
six high-ranking officials and their refusal to testify? What is
the OTP’s view of the significance of these officials and the
nature of the testimony that they might have delivered? Are
they truly individuals who would provide exculpatory evidence
for the four Accused in Trial 002? Or is this shadow-boxing by
the Defense to delay, obstruct, and try to de-legitimize Trial 002?
How seriously do you view political interference by the Hun Sen
government in the work of the ECCC?
v) October Statements by Hun Sen stating Case No. 002 would be the last

In a meeting with United Nations Secretary Ban Ki-moon in
October 27, 2010, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen said that he
would not allow further prosecutions at the ECCC after Case 002.
Hun Sen argued that further investigations would destabilize
Cambodia.
The International Co-Investigating Judge, Marcel
Lemonde, had proceeded with additional investigations while the
Cambodia Judge, You Bunleng, did not support them.
How does the OTP view allegations of political
interference by the Hun Sen government in the work of the
ECCC? What is the reaction of other international tribunals to
the potential interference by Hun Sen in determining whether or
not there is a Trial 003, and whether or not his government staff
will testify when called upon by the ECCC? If the world stays
silent, doesn't this open up the door for other nations/leaders to
stand in the way of atrocity crime investigations/trials with
impunity? Is this already happening in Rwanda? Didn’t
Ambassador Rapp a few weeks ago visit Cambodia and not only
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support the ECCC moving forward with further investigations,
but also provide some assurance that the Cambodian
government would not interfere?



